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Abstract 
This paper presents a new approach to resolving an apparent tension in Descartes’ 
discussion of scientific theories and explanations in the Principles of Philosophy. On the 
one hand, Descartes repeatedly claims that any theories presented in science must be 
certain and indubitable. On the other hand, Descartes himself presents an 
astonishing number of speculative explanations of various scientific phenomena. In 
response to this tension, commentators have suggested that Descartes changed his 
mind about scientific theories having to be certain and indubitable, that he lacked 
the conceptual resources to describe the appropriate epistemic attitude towards 
speculative theories, or that the presence of geometrical principles in these 
explanations guarantee their certainty. I argue that none of these responses is 
satisfactory and suggest a different resolution to the tension by examining Descartes’ 
notion of explanation. On Descartes’ view, providing an adequate explanation does 
not require being certain of the theories that constitute the explanans. Relatedly, the 
purpose of Cartesian explanations is not to discover the truth about the various 
underlying mechanisms that such explanations appeal to, but to support his general 
philosophical thesis that all natural phenomena can be explained by appealing to the 




In the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes purports to have given scientific explanations of an 
astonishing number and great variety of observed natural phenomena, often in terms of 
underlying unobservable mechanisms. These putative explanations are often quite 
speculative, as Descartes himself seems to acknowledge in the text. However, Descartes 
also repeatedly claims that any theories presented in science must be certain and 
indubitable. Thus there is a tension in Descartes’ writings between a requirement of 
certainty for scientific theories and his own speculative explanatory endeavors in the 
Principles. I argue against three influential attempts to resolve this tension – due 
respectively to Daniel Garber (1978, 2001), Desmond Clarke (1982, 1992), and Helen 
Hattab (2009) – and go on to suggest a different resolution to the tension by examining 
Descartes’ notion of explanation. On Descartes’ view, providing an adequate explanation 
does not require being certain of the theories that constitute the explanans. Relatedly, the 
purpose of Cartesian explanations is not to discover the truth about the underlying 
mechanisms that such explanations appeal to, but to support his general philosophical 
thesis that the extension of matter is the only principle required to account for observed 
natural phenomena. 
I will proceed as follows. In section 2, I set the stage by going over the relevant 
fundamentals of Descartes’ general epistemology of science. Then, in section 3, I discuss 
the aforementioned tension in Descartes’ writings, arising roughly from Descartes’ 
requirement of certainty for scientific theories, on the one hand, and his willingness to 
provide quite speculative putative explanations of natural phenomena, on the other hand. 
In section 4, I discuss Garber’s, Clarke’s, and Hattab’s attempts to resolve this tension, 
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and argue that none of them is satisfactory. In section 5, I analyze Descartes’ concept of 
explanation, showing how it differs substantially from most contemporary conceptions of 
scientific explanation. In section 6, I show how the tension from section 3 disappears 
given this understanding of what is involved in a Cartesian explanation. Finally, in section 
7, I discuss some additional advantages of my interpretation. Section 8 is the conclusion. 
 
2. Descartes’ Epistemology of Science 
Let us first go over the basic structure of scientific reasoning in Descartes’ philosophical 
system. Since Descartes did not distinguish between scientific and non-scientific 
reasoning, we can draw on Descartes’ more general account of epistemic reasoning 
wherever we can find it to make sense of his conception of scientific reasoning. We find 
this general account displayed most clearly in Descartes’ unpublished, but influential, 
Rules for the Direction of the Mind.1 In the Rules, Descartes’ view is that all genuine or 
scientific knowledge (scientia) is grounded in certain and indubitable ‘simple natures’. Our 
knowledge of these simple natures comes from what Descartes calls ‘intuition’, a direct 
apprehension of the truth that Descartes describes as “the conception of a clear and 
attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about 
what we are understanding” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 14). According to the view 
Descartes proposes in the Rules, all other knowledge can be inferred from these 
indubitable intuitions by what Descartes calls ‘deduction’. 
                                                
1 All references to Descartes’ writings will be to the two volumes edited and translated by 
Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 1985b). 
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It’s important to be clear that Descartes’ notion of deduction differs substantially 
from the purely formal notion of deduction that we find in contemporary logic. Roughly, 
a Cartesian deduction is a psychological process in which one first intuits the indubitable 
and self-evident truth of the premises and moves mentally from there to intuit the truth of 
the conclusion. As we shall see, Descartes similarly believes that it is possible to deduce 
various scientific theories by moving from intuitions of more basic truths, even though the 
theories in question are clearly not logically entailed by them. Indeed, Descartes explicitly 
contrasts his own conception of deduction with the type of purely formal logic with which 
he was familiar, viz. syllogistic logic, complaining that since the conclusions of syllogistic 
arguments do not have any content beyond what is already present in the premises, we 
cannot use them to learn anything new (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 37).2 
Now, although all genuine knowledge is ultimately grounded in basic intuitions in 
virtue of being deducible from them in the above sense, we should not be so rash as to 
conclude that on Descartes’ view the scientific method should always follows this simple 
route. Descartes does discuss a kind of method – synthesis – which recommends that one 
start with basic intuitions and deduce from them more specific phenomena. In the Second 
Replies (to the Meditations on First Philosophy), Descartes displays a summary of his arguments 
in the Meditations in which he explicitly follows the synthetic method. However, 
Descartes also clearly indicates that he prefers a different method of showing that some 
                                                
2 A lot more can be said about the nature of Cartesian deductions, and how they differ from both 
a contemporary conception of deduction and the syllogistic deduction used by Descartes’ 
predecessors. For relevant discussions, see Wong (1982), Gaukroger (1989), Normore (1993), 
Owen (1999, ch. 2), Nelson (2015), and Rogers and Nelson (2015). 
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specific phenomena can be deduced from basic intuitions, viz. analysis.3  While there is a 
significant debate in the secondary literature about the nature of this method and how it 
relates to Descartes synthetic method, it’s clear that analysis starts with the various 
phenomena that one aims to show to be deducible from basic intuitions. One then works 
backwards, at each step figuring out what would have to be true for the step in question 
to hold, until – hopefully – one arrives at the basic intuitions. If successful, one is then 
immediately in a position to deduce the phenomena from the basic intuitions just as if one 
had done a synthesis instead of an analysis.4 
 Descartes famously presented three overarching principles from which he claimed 
that all other knowledge could be deduced. Most relevant to scientific knowledge is 
Descartes’ principle of extension, according to which there exist bodies that are by their very 
nature extended in space: “extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature 
of corporeal substance” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 210). In addition, we have the principle 
of thought, according to which there also exist thinking substances, or souls. Finally, a 
                                                
3 Indeed, Florka (2001) argues for the stronger view that Descartes rejected synthesis altogether. 
As Florka correctly notes, Descartes was suspicious of synthesis since he associated it with the 
syllogistic logic that he famously rejected as useless for discovering genuine knowledge. However, 
even Florka must acknowledge that deductions discovered by analysis can be presented, as 
Descartes puts it, “in the synthetic style” (Cottingham et al. 1985b, 113), since such a presentation 
of the Meditations is in fact partly provided by Descartes in the Second Replies. Thus, while synthesis 
may be useless as a method for discovering new truths on Decscartes’ view, Descartes does not 
appear to have thought it useless for all purposes. 
4 This is not to say that the purpose or goal of an analysis is to eventually be able use the synthetic 
method to derive the phenomena. On the contrary, Descartes’ comments in the Second Replies 
along with the fact that the Meditations were not written in the synthetic style, indicate that he 
considered synthesis to be of quite limited value. (See also the preceeding foonote.) 
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different kind of substance altogether – God – exists and is by its very nature infinitely 
perfect in every way (infinitely good, infinitely powerful, infinitely knowing, etc.). We can 
call this the principle of God’s infinite perfection. On Descartes view, all three ‘first principles’ 
are self-evident and thus certain and indubitable, but Descartes’ more interesting claim is 
that all natural phenomena can be deduced from them. 
How exactly are natural phenomena supposed to be deduced from these 
principles? The first step is to use the principles to deduce laws of motion for material 
bodies. In deducing these laws, Descartes appeals not only to the principle of extension, 
but also to the principle of God’ infinite perfection. For example, Descartes appeals to the 
God’s infinite perfection to support the claim that God is immutable, and would thus 
create a world in which the total amount of motion remains constant through time. This 
result about the total amount of motion in the world is used as an assumption in the 
deduction of the first law of motion, according to which all simple and undivided things 
never change unless they are acted on by external causes. In an analogous way, Descartes 
deduces two other laws of motion from his first principles.5 
 Having deduced these laws of motion from first principles, Descartes proceeds 
systematically, in part III of the Principles, to deduce various mechanical theories from 
these laws. The idea is to find mechanical theories from which the observed phenomena 
                                                
5 The last of these laws concerns the collision of bodies. Having deduced this law, Descartes goes 
on to give seven rules for calculating the motions of bodies that collide. These rules don’t quite fit 
into the neat structure of principles, laws, mechanism, and phenomena that Descartes usually 
seems to be giving us. I’ll ignore this complication below, since it is (as far as I can see) orthogonal 
to the issues I’ll be focusing on. 
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can themselves be deduced, closing the gap between first principles and the phenomena 
one encounters in nature. How precisely Descartes thinks one should proceed in finding 
such theories is contentious, and we’ll look into that momentarily. But it’s at least clear 
that here Descartes can use both the laws of motion and the observed phenomena as a 
guide in his scientific theorizing. So Descartes’ mechanical theories are constrained both 
by higher-level laws of motion, and by lower-level observed phenomena. However, it is 
evident to any attentive reader of Descartes that the laws and the phenomena do not by 
themselves generally rule out all but one such theory in a given case. This basic fact about 
Descartes’ mechanical theories takes us to an apparent tension in Descartes’ writings, to 
which we now turn. 
 
3. Certainty and Scientific Theories 
A standard complaint about Descartes is that he had too high standards for what we 
would now call epistemic justification. Although this complaint often rests on a simplistic 
and anachronistic reading of Descartes, there is surely some truth in the claim that 
knowledge, on Descartes’ view, requires certainty or indubitability. The second rule in the 
Rules states that “[w]e should attend only to those objects of which our minds seem 
capable of having certain and indubitable cognition” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 10). The 
reasoning behind the rule is very revealing: 
All knowledge is certain and evident cognition. Someone who has doubts about many 
things is no wiser than one who has never given them a thought; indeed, he appears 
less wise if he has formed a false opinion about any of them. Hence it is better never to 
study at all than to occupy ourselves with objects which are so difficult that we are 
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unable to distinguish what is true from what is false, and are forced to take the 
doubtful as certain; for in such matters the risk of diminishing our knowledge is greater 
than our hope of increasing it. So, in accordance with this Rule, we reject all such 
merely probable cognition and resolve to believe only what is perfectly known and 
incapable of being doubted (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 10). 
In the Discourse on the Method, Descartes’ very first rule for attaining knowledge was 
[…] never to accept anything as true if I did not have evident knowledge of its truth: 
that is, carefully to avoid precipitate conclusions and preconceptions, and to include 
nothing more in my judgements than what presented itself to my mind so clearly and 
so distinctly that I had no occasion to doubt it (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 120). 
And, in the Principles, Descartes explains that the reason his opponents in the Schools have 
been “unable to arrive at knowledge of true principles” is that 
[…] they have all put forward as principles things of which they did not possess perfect 
knowledge. For example, there is not one of them, so far as I know, who has not 
supposed there to be weight in terrestrial bodies. Yet although experience shows us 
very clearly that the bodies we call ‘heavy’ descend towards the centre of the earth, we 
do not for all that have any knowledge of the nature of what is called ‘gravity’, that is 
to say, the cause or principle which makes bodies descend in this way, and we must 
derive such knowledge from some other source (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 182-3). 
Descartes concludes that “none of the conclusions deduced from a principle which is not 
evident can themselves be evident, even though they may be deduced from the principle 
in an evident manner” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 183). In fact, the situation is even worse, 
as Descartes brings out with an analogy: 
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[…] so long as we turn our back on the place we wish to get to, then the longer and 
faster we walk the further we get from our destination, so that even if we are 
subsequently set on the right road we cannot reach our goal as quickly as we would 
have done had we never walked in the wrong direction. The same thing happens if we 
have bad principles. The more we develop them and the more carefully we work at 
deducing various consequences from them in our belief that we are philosophizing 
well, the further we move from knowledge of the truth and from wisdom (Cottingham 
et al. 1985a, 183). 
Having false beliefs can be quite destructive, on Descartes’ view – worse than having no 
beliefs at all. 
 It’s worth emphasizing that Descartes’ requirement of certainty, as I will call it, is no 
mere accidental feature of his philosophy that can be detached and discussed in isolation 
from his broader philosophical project. As Descartes explains in the passages above, any 
uncertainty at a higher level will generate even more uncertainty at a lower level. For 
example, if Descartes were uncertain about his laws of motion, then the scientific theories 
derived from them would be at least equally – and probably more – uncertain. So, 
somehow, Descartes clearly thinks that we must have absolute certainty, or perfect 
knowledge, of anything we use in our scientific theorizing. If we don’t, the whole 
Cartesian project of deducing phenomena from first principles seems doomed. 
 The requirement for certainty conflicts rather severely with Descartes’ practice of 
giving various detailed scientific explanations in the Principles. To take a well-known 
example, Descartes explained the behavior of magnetic bodies by positing unobservably 
small screw-like particles and giving a very detailed story about how these tiny screws 
pushed ferromagnetic objects towards the poles of magnets. Furthermore, Descartes’ 
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many explanations cover a great deal of quite varied natural phenomena. The discussion 
of these explanations stretches over more than 300 articles, wherein Descartes explains 
everything from why bodies fall towards the earth to why glass is transparent. Near the 
end of the principles, Descartes even announces that “there is nothing in the whole of 
nature […] which is incapable of being explained on the basis of these selfsame 
principles” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 279). 
 Many of the detailed theories Descartes proposes to explain various natural 
phenomena are quite ingenious. In that respect, Descartes’ scientific project looks quite 
familiar to a contemporary reader. On the other hand, a contemporary reader is bound 
to be at least somewhat disappointed when she looks for Descartes’ reasons for proposing 
these theories rather than alternative theories. Of course, the theories Descartes proposes 
are constrained somewhat by the fact that they are part of a deduction from first 
principles to phenomena. That is, an adequate explanation must invoke theories that are 
consistent both with first principles and laws of motion – from which they are deduced – 
and with observable phenomena – which are derived from them. But although this 
certainly constrains the theories available for use in scientific explanations, it does not at 
all single out the theories Descartes ends up proposing, except perhaps in exceptional 
cases. Why, for example, does Descartes think that the tiny particles that emerge from 
magnets are screw-shaped rather than, say, shaped like spikes? 
 Descartes seems to have recognized this mismatch between evidence and theory 
in the Principles. Descartes’ explanations of heavenly phenomena are prefaced by 
Descartes telling the reader that he wishes to “put forward everything that I am about to 
write simply as a hypothesis”, adding in the French edition that such a hypothesis “is 
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perhaps far from the truth” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 255). The same goes for Descartes’ 
theory about the motion or otherwise of the earth: “I wish this to be considered simply as 
a hypothesis [addition in the French edition: “or supposition that may be false”] and not 
as the real truth” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 251). But the clearest indication that 
Descartes had reservations about the epistemic status of his scientific theories is perhaps 
to be found in one of the last articles of the Principles: 
[…] although this method may enable us to understand how all the things in nature 
could have arisen, it should not therefore be inferred that they were in fact made in 
this way. Just as the same craftsman could make two clocks which tell the time equally 
well and look completely alike from the outside but have completely different 
assemblies of wheels inside, so the supreme craftsman of the real world could have 
produced all that we see in several different ways. I am very happy to admit this […] 
(Cottingham et al. 1985a, 289). 
Descartes is very happy to admit that his scientific theories may very well be mistaken. 
Somehow, being wrong about the mechanical theories deduced at the penultimate 
step of a Cartesian deduction doesn’t bother Descartes at all. Yet this is clearly in tension 
with his requirement of certainty, which is unambiguously expressed in the Rules, the 
Discourse and in the Principles themselves. Note that the requirement of certainty is present 
even in the preface to the French edition, which was written after the Latin text had 
already been published and so would have been a perfect opportunity for Descartes to 
relax or abandon the requirement. Instead, as we have seen, Descartes does the opposite. 
There is clearly a tension here: How can Descartes uphold his requirement of certainty 
and yet give so blatantly speculative explanations in the Principles – explanations that he 
admits may be “far from the truth”? Is Descartes violating his own methodological and 
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epistemological strictures when he gives scientific explanations for observed natural 
phenomena? 
 
4. Resolutions in the Secondary Literature 
This tension has not gone unnoticed in the secondary literature. In this section, I discuss 
three different attempts to resolve the tension in the secondary literature, due respectively 
to Daniel Garber (1978, 2001), Desmond Clarke (1982, 1992), and Helen Hattab (2009). 
Although I will argue that none of these commentators have resolved the tension in an 
entirely satisfactory manner, it seems to me that much of what they point out is not only 
compatible but also complementary to what I will end up arguing is the correct resolution 
to the tension. In this section, however, I want to highlight the points at which I think 
their resolutions fall short. 
Garber (1978, 2001), impressed by the apparently conflicting remarks Descartes 
makes concerning certainty and his own theorizing, suggests that Descartes simply 
changed his mind about whether certainty was possible concerning the unobservable 
causes of observed phenomena. For whatever reason, Descartes came to realize that a 
form of hypothetical reasoning (what we might now call hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning), which is less secure than Cartesian deduction, was necessary in natural 
science. This change, on Garber’s view, took place sometime after writing the Rules, the 
Discourse, and the Essays, but before writing the Principles, where most of Descartes’ 
scientific theorizing takes place. However, Garber makes no serious attempt at explaining 
why Descartes came to think that his method of deduction from first principles was 
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inadequate and why this form of hypothetical reasoning would therefore be 
indispensible.6 
Garber’s suggestion faces at least three serious problems. First, Garber gives us no 
independent evidence for the thesis that Descartes changed his mind so dramatically 
between writing the Principles and his earlier work. So the presumption should surely be 
that Descartes saw the philosophical and scientific project in the Principles as a 
continuation of his earlier philosophical projects. Second, as we have seen, Descartes 
continues to claim that scientific theorizing must be certain even in the Principles. Thus, 
contrary to what Garber seems to be assuming, the relevant tension in Descartes’ thought 
is not merely a tension between what Descartes says in the Principles and what he says in 
earlier writings. Third, and finally, if there was such a change in Descartes’ thought 
concerning the certainty required of scientific theories, one should expect that change to 
have come about not between the Essays and the Principles, but before the Essays (and thus 
before the Discourse). After all, a large part of the Essays contain the very same kind of 
                                                
6 Garber does end his discussion of the issue with some speculations as to why Descartes might 
have changed his mind: 
Perhaps he came to appreciate the obscurity of the appeal to intuition, his earlier 
conception of how corpuscular substructures are to be found, and saw in hypothetical 
argument the clarity he sought, even if it meant sacrificing certainty. Perhaps in 
actually working out and defending his views on the inner nature of things, he came to 
appreciate the sheer complexity of nature, and saw in hypothetical argument a better 
way of coming to grips with the world. But for whatever reason, Descartes was led to 
give up his earlier extravagant claims about what we can know and how, in favor of 
the relatively more modest claims in the Principia (Garber 2001, 129). 
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speculative theorizing as do the Principles. In sum, then, there seem to be strong reasons to 
continue to look for a better way of understanding of Descartes’ scientific project.7 
We turn next  to Clarke’s (1982, 1992) interpretation. On Clarke’s view, it’s a 
mistake to think that Descartes required certainty of the scientific explanations that he 
gives in the Principles. Rather, Clarke argues that Descartes’ apparent claims of certainty 
concerning his scientific explanations are due to his lacking a concept of probability 
between absolute certainty and mere guesswork – a concept that is appropriate to the 
kind of confirmation that is obtained by hypothetical reasoning. The idea is that because 
Descartes lacked any concept of this in-between epistemic state, he was sometimes forced 
to convey that his scientific explanations were not merely guesswork by calling them 
‘certain’, and at other times he needed to convey that they were less certain than, say, his 
first principles, by denying that these explanations were, again, ‘certain’. On Clarke’s 
view, then, the apparent conflict in Descartes’ writing is due to a kind of conceptual 
deficiency that plagued Descartes as well as his contemporaries: “Descartes’ efforts to 
describe the degree of certainty that resulted from his scientific practice are best 
understood as a doomed attempt to classify the probability produced by the new scientific 
method in the language of the scholastics” (Clarke 1992, 275). 
There are at least two serious problems with Clark’s suggestion, however. First, 
while Descartes obviously lacked anything like the contemporary concept of probability,8 
                                                
7 To be sure, Garber (1978) acknowledges that his suggestion is speculative, noting that “[t]hough 
Descartes’ goal was certainty, mine is not.” Garber presents his interpretation merely as “one line 
for reinterpreting [Descartes’] scientific enterprise” (1978, 116). 
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it does not follow that Descartes could not express an intermediate epistemic status 
between certainty and mere speculation. After all, Descartes would surely have been 
capable of constructing his own concept of an intermediate kind of epistemic status had 
he thought it served an important purpose, such as to clarify the epistemic status of his 
scientific explanations. Indeed (and this is the second problem with Clarke’s suggestion) 
Descartes does sometimes use a concept of a kind of in-between epistemic state: At the end 
of the Principles, Descartes explicitly considers the possibility that his explanations may 
only possess ‘moral certainty’, which can fall short of ‘absolute certainty’ (Cottingham et 
al. 1985a, 289-290). So why didn’t Descartes just say throughout that his scientific 
explanations were ‘morally certain’? At the very least, this suggests that Descartes was 
well aware of the possibility of describing scientific theorizing in an epistemically nuanced 
manner.  
A final discussion bearing on the aforementioned tension in Descartes’ thought 
can be found in the work of Helen Hattab (2009). Hattab argues that Descartes’ scientific 
demonstrations, both in his earlier work and also in the Principles, appealed to various 
geometrical principles about sensed objects. Hattab agrees with Garber and Clarke that 
Descartes is employing a form of hypothetical reasoning in which we reason from effects 
to causes by first showing how the effects can be deduced from the causes. However, in 
contrast to Garber and Clarke, Hattab emphasizes that Descartes’ geometrical principles 
play a crucial role as premises in this hypothetical form of reasoning. On Hattab’s view, 
                                                                                                                                            
8 The very concept of mathematical probability, along with the probability calculus itself, had not 
yet been developed when Descartes was writing the Principles in and before 1644, but it would 
develop quite rapidly soon afterwards (see Hacking 2006). 
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the occurrence of these geometical principles within such a hypothetical form of 
reasoning explains why Descartes frequently calls his demonstrations ‘mathematical’. 
Furthermore (and more relevantly for our purposes), Hattab claims that the presence of 
geometrical principles in Descartes’ demonstrations, in the Principles and elsewhere, 
“guarantees the certainty of the conclusion that is demonstrated” (Hattab 2009, 131).  
Contra Garber and Clarke, Hattab thus concludes that Descartes took himself to have 
upheld his requirement of certainty in the Principles after all (Hattab 2009, 132). 
While Hattab’s account of the role of geometrical principles in Cartesian 
demonstrations is illuminating in many respects, it is deeply problematic as a resolution of 
the tension between Descartes’ requirement of certainty and his speculative explanations 
in the Principles. One problem is that what Hattab refers to as the “conclusions” of 
Descartes’ demonstrations are not the mechanical theories that serve as the explanantia in 
Descartes’s explanations but the observed natural phenomena that serve as the 
explananda.9 As Garber and Clarke both emphasize, however, the tension in Descartes’ 
thought between his speculative explanantions and his requirement of certainty do not 
arise at the level of the observed explananda but at the level of the speculative 
explanantia. So even if Hattab were right that the presence of geometrical principles in 
Cartesian demonstrations guarantees the certainty of their conclusions (i.e. the 
                                                
9 Here I am following standard philosophical usage in calling the things that do the explaining in 
an explanation explanans (plural: explanantia) and the things that are explained in an explanation 
explanandum (plural: explananda). Note that on this terminology an explanation is neither identical to 
its explanandum nor its explanans. 
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explananda), this would not resolve the tension since it is not the certainty of these 
conclusions that is at issue.10 
 Another problem with Hattab’s account is that there is no reason why Descartes 
would think that the presence of geometrical principles within his demonstrations would 
by itself bestow any kind of certainty on its conclusions. Of course, if Descartes’ 
conclusions could be derived from geometrical principles alone, then Descartes could 
reasonably claim that the conclusions have as much certainty as the geometrical 
principles themselves. However, as Hattab (2009, 130-131) herself notes, these 
geometrical principles only function as the “middle terms” of demonstrations that begin 
by assuming the very mechanical theories whose epistemic status is at issue. Since these 
mechanical theories obviously cannot be assumed to be certain at this point (i.e. prior to 
making the hypothetical arguments for them), such a “demonstration” would obviously 
not guarantee the certainty of the conclusion. If Descartes thought otherwise he would 
have been guilty of the elementary epistemological mistake of attributing certainty to a 
conclusion of an argument in virtue of the fact that one of its premises is certain. 
In sum, Hattab’s otherwise illuminating account of the role of geometrical 
principles in Cartesian demonstrations is of no help in resolving the aforementioned 
tension in Descartes’ thought. Clarke’s proposal that Descartes lacked a concept of an in-
                                                
10 To be sure, if Descartes employed a form of hypothetical reasoning, there is a sense in which it 
is the certainty of conclusions that is at issue. That is, what is at issue is the certainty of the 
hypotheses inferred in hypothetical reasoning – and we may want to refer to these hypotheses as 
the “conclusions” of hypothetical inferences. It is clear, however, that this is not how Hattab is 
using the term. Rather, Hattab uses ‘conclusion’ in this context to refer to the propositions that 
are deduced from the hypotheses. 
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between epistemic state is both implausible in its own right and in conflict with Descartes’ 
proclamations in the final passages of the Principles. Finally, Garber’s suggestion that 
Descartes abandoned the requirement of certainty before writing the Principles conflicts 
with textual evidence and is implausible in light of the timeline of Descartes’ work. I 
therefore suggest that we look for another resolution to the tension between Descartes’ 
requirement of certainty for scientific theories and his speculative explanations in the 
Principles. 
 
5. Cartesian Explanations 
In this section and the next, I argue that the key to resolving the tension described in 
section 3 is to understand what an explanation is in Descartes’ philosophical system. 
Descartes does not tell us explicitly how he thinks of explanations, e.g. by giving a 
definition or general characterization, but we can piece together a good enough 
understanding from various remarks in the Principles and elsewhere. It turns out, I will 
argue, that Descartes’ conception of scientific explanations differs significantly from 
standard contemporary conceptions in at least two important ways. 
 The first thing to note is that Cartesian explanations are, in a sense to be 
explicated, the converse of Cartesian deductions. This is evident from a number of 
passages in the Principles, for example: 
[…] in order to come to know the true nature of this visible world, it is not enough to 
find causes which provide an explanation of what we see far off in the heavens; the 
selfsame causes must also allow everything which we see right here on earth to be 
deduced from them. There is, however, no need for us to consider all these terrestrial 
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phenomena in order to determine the causes of more general things. But we shall 
know that we have determined such causes correctly afterwards, when we notice that 
they serve to explain not only the effects which we were originally looking at, but all 
these other phenomena, which we were not thinking of beforehand (Cottingham et al. 
1985a, 255). 
As this reveals, Descartes uses ‘explanation’ as a different way of saying that something 
can be deduced from something else. So, on Descartes’ view, A explains B if and only if B 
can be deduced from A. However, we must also remember what is involved in a 
Cartesian deduction. For Descartes, one cannot simply take a proposition at random and 
deduce something from it. Unless such a proposition represents an idea that is itself either 
intuited directly or deducible from an intuited idea, it will be confused and thus not 
eligible to serve as the premise of a further deduction. This is why, as we saw in section 3, 
deductions must start from first principles – self-evident truths – or start from something 
else that can itself be deduced from first principles. This is not to say that nothing but first 
principles can be used or appealed to in a Cartesian deduction – indeed, it has been 
argued convincingly that Descartes frequently appeals to various other facts and 
assumptions in his deductions, at least in his later works.11 But it does mean that a 
Cartesian deduction must be at least partly grounded in first principles in the sense that 
the first principles must figure in the deduction when it is spelled out in full detail. 
                                                
11  In particular, there is clearly an important sence in which experience enters into such 
deductions. For example, in order to deduce (in a Cartesian sense) that magnets emit screw-like 
particles, Descartes needs to make certain empirical observations about the actual behaviour of 
magnetic objects. That being said, there is little agreement in the secondary literature on exactly 
what role experience plays in Cartesian deductions (see, e.g, Garber 1993 and references therein). 
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 This tells us something important about Descartes’ conception of explanation. 
Since A explains B if and only if B can be deduced from A, and since B can be deduced 
from A only if A is itself deducible from first principles, it follows that A explains B only if 
A can itself be explained by appealing to first principles. This is why Descartes finds it 
appropriate, in The World, to reject explanations of the properties of material bodies that 
appeal to scholastic forms such as heat, cold, moisture, and dryness on the grounds that 
“these qualities themselves seem to me to need explanation” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 
89). This argument would be a complete non sequitur unless Descartes thought that 
explanations must at least partly bottom out in something that does not itself need to be 
explained, viz. the self-explanatory first principles. Note how this differs from standard 
contemporary conceptions of explanations: We do not now ordinarily think that 
explaining something requires that both it, and the thing that explains it, be at least partly 
explainable by more explanatorily basic principles. Throwing the baseball towards the 
window explains, we think, why the window shattered, independently of whether the 
throwing of the baseball can itself be explained by some more basic principles. 
Descartes’ conception of explanations as requiring a kind of explanatory 
grounding in first principles may seem quite puzzling in the eyes of a contemporary 
reader. On Descartes’ conception of explanation, whenever A explains B it follows 
conceptually that the first principles (from which A, and thus B, can be deduced) can also 
be used to explain B. Thus, to show that anything explains a given phenomenon is to 
show that the first principles can be used to do so as well. This is important, as I’ll argue 
in more detail below, because it means that an argument that Descartes makes for some A 
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explaining some B may ultimately be an argument for the conclusion that the first 
principles can be used to explain B. (We will return to this in section 6 below.) 
The next thing to note is what this requirement of explanations being grounded in 
first principles implies about explanations of natural phenomena. Since all natural 
phenomena, in some way or another, concern the behaviors of material bodies, it is clear 
that in a Cartesian deduction from first principles one must appeal to the first principle 
that Descartes thinks governs such bodies, viz. the principle of extension. So, in this sense, 
all scientific explanations must ultimately be grounded in the principle of extension. This 
requirement of deducibility of explanantia from the principle of extension tells us 
something extremely important about Descartes’ view of scientific explanations: all 
scientific explanations must be mechanical explanations. This is because only mechanical 
explanations could be grounded in the principle of extension in the appropriate way. A 
non-mechanical explanation – e.g. the explanation of magnetism in terms of brute 
magnetic powers – is not deducible from the principle of extension, because what 
distinguishes a magnet from other things, on a non-mechanical explanation, is not spelled 
out in terms of the different extensions of such bodies, or any upshot thereof (such as their 
motions or positions). In sum, all explanations of natural phenomena must necessarily be 
mechanical, for Descartes, since any non-mechanical explanation fails to be grounded in 
the principle of extension. 
 Another feature of Cartesian explanations that might surprise a contemporary 
reader is that, for Descartes, theories can explain even if they are not true. As a 
corollary,theories can serve as part of the explanans of an adequate act of Cartesian 
explanation even if they are not taken to be true by the explainer. This is apparent from a 
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number of illuminating passages in the Principles. In the most famous such passage, 
Descartes explicitly claims that theories that are known to be false can sometimes provide 
better explanations than theories that are known to be true: 
[…] in order to provide a better explanation for the things found in nature, I shall take 
my investigation of their causes right back to a time before the period when I believe 
that the causes actually came into existence. […] if we want to understand the nature 
of plants or of men, it is much better to consider how they can gradually grow from 
seeds than to consider how they were created by God at the very beginning of the 
world. Thus we may be able to think up certain very simple and easily known 
principles which can serve, as it were, as the seeds from which we can demonstrate 
that the stars, the earth and indeed everything we observe in this visible world could 
have sprung. For although we know for sure that they never did arise in this way, we 
shall be able to provide a much better explanation of their nature by this method than 
if we merely described them as they now are [French edition adds: “or as we believe 
them to have been created] (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 256).12 
There are, of course, obvious religious motivations for Descartes to include this 
submission to church doctrine in the Principles. However, that doesn’t explain why 
Descartes thought that this tension between his explanations and church doctrine could 
be resolved in the manner suggested in the passage. If Descartes had taken explanations 
to require true explanantia, then Descartes’ comments in the passage do nothing at all to 
resolve the conflict. Thus, if Descartes was indeed worried about contradicting church 
doctrine, one should expect Descartes to have addressed this conflict in much more detail 
                                                
12 See also very similar comments in the Discourse, part V (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 133-134). 
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so as to at least provide the beginnings of a genuine resolution. By contrast, if Descartes 
had a more liberal conception of explanation on which false hypotheses could serve as 
explanantia in scientific explanations, Descartes’ brief treatment of the tension is entirely 
appropriate: the issue does not need to be discussed further because on this conception 
there is no conflict at all between appealing to a hypothesis in an explanation and 
simultaneously recognizing that it is not true. 
Besides, this is not the only passage in which Descartes commits to it being 
possible for false hypotheses to figure in genuine explanations. For example, article 15 in 
part III is entitled “The observed motions of the planets may be explained by various 
hypotheses.” In the article, Descartes tells us that “astronomers have produced three 
different hypotheses, i.e. suppositions, which are regarded not as being true, but merely as 
being suitable for explaining the appearances.” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 250) Since at 
most one of these three hypotheses could be true, this implies that on Descartes’ 
conception of explanation, the explanantia of adequate explanations need not be true. 
Since there are no religious motivations in play here, there is no reason not to take this 
assertion and its implications at face value.13 
Now, one consequence of this feature of Cartesian explanations is that perfectly 
good Cartesian deductions can contain steps that are not regarded as true. To see how 
this follows, just recall that explanations are simply the converse of deductions grounded 
in first principles. So if explanations can contain explanantia that are not regarded as 
true, the steps in a Cartesian deduction can also not be regarded as true. This fits with 
                                                
13 See also Principles, part III, article 44 (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 255). 
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various remarks that Descartes makes about deductions, for example the following 
passage in the Discourse: 
I venture to say that I have never noticed anything in them [Descartes’ senses] which I 
could not explain quite easily by the principles I had discovered. But I must also admit 
that the power of nature is so ample and so vast, and these principles so simple and so 
general, that I notice hardly any particular effect of which I do not know at once that 
it can be deduced from the principles in many different ways; and my greatest 
difficulty is usually to discover in which of these ways it depends on them (Cottingham 
et al. 1985a, 144). 
Clearly, since at most one of these “many different ways” of deducing the phenomena 
goes through a theory that is regarded as true, a deduction can go through steps that are 
not regarded as true and still count as a Cartesian deduction. 
We have seen that explanations need not be regarded as true, and certainly need 
not be known to be true. Does this mean that any explanation will do, as long as it is 
mechanical? No. It is clear both from what Descartes says about explanations, and from 
the particular explanations that he gives, that an adequate explanation must also be the 
clearest and most distinct of the available explanations. And of course, the mechanical 
explanations must also be consistent with the observations it explains and be deducible 
from the laws of motion. However, although this puts constraints on adequate Cartesian 
explanations, it does not mean that the explanantia in such explanations need to be 
regarded as true, and it certainly does not mean that they need to be known to be true. 
 Our conclusions so far about the role of truth in Cartesian explanations will no 
doubt sound quite strange to a contemporary reader who is used to thinking of genuine 
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explanations as requiring true explanantia.14 In what sense, such a reader will ask, could 
an explanation be correct or adequate if the theories to which it appeals are not true or at 
least believed to be true? The answer becomes clearer if we take care to distinguish a 
contemporary distinction first drawn explicitly by William Dray (1957) between why-
actually explanations and how-possibly explanations. The former is what is standardly referred to 
with the unqualified term “explanation” in contemporary philosophical parlance. By 
contrast, the latter – how-possibly explanations – are invariably discussed separately and 
carefully contrasted with regular (i.e. why-actually) explanations.15 In brief, a how-possibly 
explanation shows how something (the explanandum) could possibly be the case given 
certain constraints, and thus answers the question “How could this (possibly) be the 
case?” rather than the more standard explanation-seeking why-question “Why is this 
(actually) the case?”16 
                                                
14 The requirement that explanantia be true was explicitly made in Hempel and Oppenheim’s 
(1948) seminal article on scientific explanations, which set the stage for the ensuing debate about 
scientific explanations in the latter half of the 20th century. This requirement is rarely questioned, 
although see van Fraassen (1980, 97-101) for a notable exception. 
15 See, for example, Salmon (1992, 9-10). 
16 Another way of characterizing the distinction between why-actually explanations and how-
possibly explanations is in terms of what sort of presumption is being rebutted in the explanation. 
This is how Dray distinguishes the two kinds of explanations at one point in his original 
discussion: 
In explaining why something happened, if a presumption enters at all, we rebut 
a presumption that it need not have happened, by showing that, in the light of 
certain considerations (perhaps laws as well as facts), it had to happen. But in 
explaining how something could have happened, we rebut the presumption that 
it could not have happened, by showing that, in the light of certain further facts, 
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Note that perfectly adequate how-possibly explanations can appeal to hypotheses 
that are not regarded as true. For example, I might explain how it is possible that my 
colleague Smith could afford a Ferrari by suggesting that perhaps he won the lottery. This 
would be a correct how-possibly explanation since it lays out a possibility on which Smith 
would afford the Ferrari, even though I may find it highly unlikely that this possibility has 
been actualized.17 Note also that although why-actually explanations and how-possibly 
explanations are distinct kinds of explanation, there is an intimate logical relationship 
between them in that a how-possibly explanation illustrates by example that a 
corresponding why-actually explanation could be correct. For example, having explained 
how it is possible for Smith to have bought a Ferrari by suggesting that perhaps he won 
the lottery (a how-possibly explanation), I have also proved that it could be that Smith was 
actually able to buy a Ferrari because he won the lottery (which would be a why-actually 
explanation). 
Now, since the distinction between why-actually and how-possibly explanations 
was not available to Descartes, it is not unreasonable to assume that at least some of what 
Descartes says about explanation applies to the wider category of explanations which 
includes both standard why-actually explanations and their frequently overlooked sibling, 
how-possibly explanations. Indeed, some of Descartes’ comments about explanations 
                                                                                                                                            
there is after all no good reason for supposing that it could not have happened 
(Dray 1957, 161). 
17 Indeed, I might even be certain that my suggestion is correct qua how-possibly explanation, i.e. 
that this is a possible way in which Smith could have financed the Ferrari, even while consistenly 
finding it highly unlikely that Smith won the lottery. 
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make little sense on the narrow conception of explanations that includes only why-
actually explanations to the exclusion of how-possibly explanations. For example, we 
have seen that at the end of the Principles Descartes claims that although his method “may 
enable us to understand how all the things in nature could have arisen, it should not 
therefore be inferred that they were in fact made in this way” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 
289). Later in the same article, Descartes adds that the same is true of Aristotle’s 
explanations in the Meteorologica (as if to show that he is not operating with an 
ideosyncratic conception of scientific explanations): 
[W]hen dealing with things not manifest to the senses, [Aristotle] reckons he has provided 
adequate reasons and demonstrations if he can simply show that such things are capable 
of occurring in accordance with his explanations (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 289). 
Descartes’ talk of using his explanations to understand how things “could have arisen” 
and show how they “are capable of occurring” strongly suggests that Descartes was at 
least sometimes referring to what we would now call how-possibly explanations.  
I do not mean to suggest that Descartes consistently used the term ‘explanation’ as 
specifically referring to how-possibly explanations to the exclusion of why-actually 
explanations. Since Descartes cannot be expected to have drawn this distinction at all, 
Descartes is most likely to have been struggling to express his views in the Principles using a 
single concept to describe two importantly different kinds of things.18 So while Descartes 
may sometimes have been using ‘explanation’ to refer to why-actually explanations, we 
                                                
18 Descartes’ situation in this regard would be similar to that of Newtonian physicists using a single 
concept of mass before the distinction between rest mass and relativistic mass was introduced in 
special relativity. 
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have seen evidence that Descartes is at least sometimes using the same term to refer to 
how-possibly explanations as well. The important point here is just that we can make 
sense of Descartes’ contention that explanations need not appeal to true hypotheses by 
the independently plausible and textually supported suggestion that Descartes’ concept of 
explanation is not as precise as the contemporary conception on which all explanations, 
unless otherwise specified, are assumed to be why-actually explanations. 
Concluding this section, we have seen that an explanation requires both more and 
less on a Cartesian conception than it does on most contemporary conceptions – less 
because the theories used in an explanation need not be regarded as true in every case, 
and more because an explanation requires a deductive link with first principles, which in 
turn means that all scientific explanations must be mechanical. Together, I think, these 
two features of Cartesian explanations resolve the apparent tension described in section 3. 
 
6. Resolving the Tension 
Recall that the tension described in section 3 was between Descartes’ requirement of 
certainty for scientific theories, on the one hand, and Descartes’ practice of giving what 
he himself recognized as speculative mechanical explanations for various natural 
phenomena. As we saw in section 4, the interpretations proposed by Garber, Clarke, and 
Hattab do not resolve this tension in an adequate manner. In this section, equipped with 
the understanding of Cartesian explanations that I have just given, I will attempt to do 
better in this regard. Specifically, I shall argue that Descartes’ practice of giving 
speculative mechanical explanations is perfectly consistent with his requirement of 
certainty for scientific theories, given the right account of Cartesian explanations. 
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 As we have seen, an adequate explanation of something, on the Cartesian 
conception, does not necessarily require the explanans to be true. So, a fortiori, to be 
certain that something is an adequate explanation does not necessarily require being 
certain that the explanans is true.19 What is required is that the explanation be the 
clearest and most distinct mechanical explanation that fits with observed natural 
phenomena, the relevant laws of motion, and Descartes’ first principles. So long as the 
mechanical theory Descartes can come up with meets these quite weak requirements, the 
theory may serve as the explanans in an explanation of some natural phenomena. 
Because this is all that’s required of some explanations, Descartes can be certain of these 
explanations even though he is uncertain about the mechanical theories that serve as the 
explanantia in such explanations. 
 If this seems puzzling, recall how why-actually explanations differ from how-
possibly explanations in that the latter can be regarded as correct or adequate even if one 
does not believe that the hypotheses appealed to in them are true. By the same token, one 
can be certain that a how-possibly explanation is correct or adequate (qua how-possibly 
explanation) while consistently being uncertain about the hypotheses that serve as the 
explanantia. For example, I might be certain that Smith’s winning the lottery is is a 
possible way in which Smith could have financed his Ferrari even though I find it highly 
unlikely that Smith in fact bought a winning ticket. Similarly, Descartes can be certain 
that magnetism could consist in the movement of tiny screw-like particles that push 
                                                
19 This follows from the more general principle that if some proposition P1 is not a necessary 
condition for another proposition P2, then being certain that P1 is true is not a necessary condition 
for being certain that P2 is true. 
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ferromagnetic objects towards magnetic poles while simultaneously recognizing that a 
rival theory is quite possibly true. In that case, Descartes would be certain about a how-
possibly explanation while being uncertain about the corresponding why-actually 
explanation. 
 You might think that this makes Cartesian explanations too easy to get. It’s 
certainly true that many scientific explanations are, in an important way, much easier to 
achieve on the Cartesian picture than on most contemporary conceptions. But this is 
something Descartes acknowledges explicitly. Recall Descartes’ seemingly immodest 
announcement in the Discourse: “I venture to say that I have never noticed anything in 
them [Descartes’ senses] which I could not explain quite easily by the principles I had 
discovered” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 144). There is no reason to think that Descartes is 
taking an uncharacteristically arrogant stance here. Rather, Descartes is merely laying out 
the consequence of his view that explanations are often easy to get, on his own conception 
of what explanations consist in. 
However, although Cartesian explanations are in one sense quite easy to get, 
finding a Cartesian explanation is not a trivial project. It may require substantial 
theorizing. This is because, first of all, any Cartesian explanation of observed phenomena 
must be mechanical – otherwise it could not be grounded in first principles. For example, 
the explanations in terms of things’ occult powers given by the Schoolmen will not do, 
because they appeal to various occult powers rather than the extension of material bodies. 
So, while finding an explanation is in one way quite easy, it is in another way quite hard, 
since the explanation must be mechanical. Moreover, the mechanical explanation in 
question must also be the clearest and most distinct explanation that is consistent with 
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observed natural phenomena and all the laws of motion and first principles. Finding 
explanations of natural phenomena – such as gravitational pull, light refraction, and 
magnetism – that meet these conditions is not a trivial task. 
 I have argued that Descartes can allow himself to speculate about the underlying 
mechanical explanations of natural phenomena because the theories that figure in such 
explanations need not be regarded as true, and thus need not meet Descartes stringent 
epistemic standards for scientific theorizing more generally. But one might still wonder 
what the purpose is, for Descartes, of finding scientific explanations if the theories used in 
such explanations are not to be regarded as true. For if the theories that Descartes 
proposes to explain such phenomena do not meet the epistemic standards Descartes set 
for himself, it is hard to see why Descartes would have spent so much time giving such 
explanations in the Principles. What value, if any, is there in giving mechanical 
explanations for natural phenomena if these explanations are bound to give us only the 
uncertain knowledge that Descartes explicitly claims we should reject?20 
 The answer is that Cartesian explanations have epistemic value that is 
independent of the epistemic value of the mechanical theories that figure in such 
explanations. In short, the multitude and variety of such explanations are indicative of the 
explanatory power of the first principles. Consider, for example, the following passage 
(and others quoted immediately below): 
                                                
20 Recall here the passage from the Rules quoted in section 2, which concludes that we should 
“reject all […] merely probable cognition and resolve to believe only what is perfectly known and 
incapable of being doubted” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 10). 
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And since all natural phenomena can be explained in this way, as will become clear in 
what follows, I do not think that any other principles are either admissible or desirable 
in physics (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 247). 
Of course, Descartes was well aware that he could not actually carry out all explanations 
of all natural phenomena in the Principles, but he nevertheless considered himself to have 
done enough to suggest that the project could, in principle, be completed: 
Admittedly, I have not dealt with all things, for this would be impossible. But I think I 
have explained all the things I have had occasion to deal with in such a way that those 
who read the book attentively will be convinced that in order to arrive at the highest 
knowledge of which the human mind is capable there is no need to look for any 
principles other than those I have provided (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 184). 
As Descartes explains here, the fact that natural phenomena could all be explained by 
these principles justify Descartes’ claim that the principles of extension, thought and 
God’s infinite perfection are the only first principles that govern natural phenomena. The 
greater number and variation of phenomena that can be deduced from these few 
principles, the greater is the case for Descartes’ contention that genuine science need not 
proceed by applying any other principles. 
Note that it is precisely this explanatory comprehensiveness of his first principles 
that Descartes needs to justify in his philosophical system. Descartes acknowledges that 
everyone grants that the first principles are true and self-evident: 
[…] they have been known for all time and indeed accepted as true and indubitable 
by everyone, with the sole exception of the existence of God, which some people have 
called into doubt because they have attributed too much to sensory perceptions, and 
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God cannot be seen or touched. Yet although all the truths which I include among my 
principles have been known for all time by everyone, there has, so far as I know, been 
no one up till now who has recognized them as the principles of philosophy, that is to 
say, as the principles which enable us to deduce the knowledge of all the other things 
to be found in the world (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 184). 
As Descartes explains here, the question is not whether the first principles are true, but 
whether the first principles are all we need. Deduced phenomena can help justify 
Descartes’ positive answer to that question, even though they cannot help to justify the 
principles themselves. 
Summing up, the way to alleviate the apparent tension between Descartes’ 
requirement of certainty and his speculative scientific explanations is to notice that 
Cartesian explanation can be certain even if the mechanical theories which figure in them 
are not. Not only can Descartes thus uphold his requirement of certainty despite the 
speculative nature of the theories he uses in his explanations, but because scientific 
explanations still have to satisfy the requirement of being deducible from first principles, 
these explanations still connect the first principles with the natural phenomena by a 
deduction. And the fact that such deductions from first principles are possible for all the 
observed natural phenomena that Descartes considers in turn supports Descartes’ claim 
that these first principles are the only principles one needs in science. 
  
7. Other Advantages 
I have argued that the account of Cartesian explanations presented in section 5 helps us 
resolve the tension described in section 3. That’s the main advantage of this 
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interpretation, but there are other advantages as well. None of these additional 
advantages are meant to constitute conclusive arguments for the interpretation, at least 
not taken separately. My contention is that together with resolving the tension from 
section 3, they constitute a strong overall case for this reading of Descartes. 
 First of all, there is considerable textual evidence for this interpretation. We have 
seen a lot of that evidence already, scattered throughout this paper. Let me now draw 
attention to one particularly illuminating remark in the Principles, viz. the title of section 
204: “With regard to the things which cannot be perceived by the senses, it is enough to 
explain their possible nature, even though their actual nature may be different” 
(Cottingham et al. 1985a, 289). 21  On the current interpretation, Descartes is here 
expressing precisely the point that his mechanical explanations need not proceed through 
mechanical theories that one can be certain are true; rather, the nature of the underlying 
mechanisms “may be different”.22 Of course, as Descartes explains in the article, the 
mechanical theories must at least “correspond accurately with all the phenomena of 
nature”. But that’s it. If Descartes has met this requirement, he says, “I have achieved 
enough” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 289). 
Admittedly, Descartes goes on to express his hope that his readers will recognize 
that he has achieved more than this, claiming that his explanations are also “at least 
                                                
21 The French addition adds: “and this is all Aristotle tried to do”. 
22 Note how closely this talk of explaining the possible natures of things rather than their actual 
natures matches the distinction between how-possibly and why-actually explanation. Indeed, it 
appears that Descartes was here expressing, to the best of his abilities, the thought that how-
possibly explanations can be “good enough” when why-actually explanations are not available. 
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morally certain” in the title of section 205. Indeeed, the title of section 206 adds that his 
explanations even “possess more than moral certainty”, i.e. absolute certainty. But it is 
striking that Descartes does not see it as a requirement on the success of his overall project 
in the Principles that the theories appealed to in his proposed explanations must be true. 
Although Descartes clearly hopes that the theories he has proposed will perhaps be 
recognized as possessing some level of certainty (moral or absolute), his main contention is 
clearly that the natural phenomena he has considered could be explained in the 
mechanistic manner he proposes. Indeed, Descartes is quite clear about this in the body 
of the section, which ends with Descartes claiming that once we accept certain basic 
pieces of Descartes’ mechanical worldview, 
[…] it seems that all the other phenomena, ot at least the general features of the universe 
and the earth which I have described, can hardly be intelligibly explained except in the 
way I have suggested (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 291). 
Note that the object of Descartes purported absolute certainty here is not the various 
scientific theories he puts forward in the preceeding sections, but the proposition that (the 
general features of) all natural phenomena can only be explained in the way Descartes 
has proposed, i.e. mechanically. So Descartes is not claiming to be certain about the 
mechanical theories to which he appeals in his scientific explanations, but about the 
general philosophical doctrine that natural phenomena can only be explained 
mechanically. 
A second advantage of the current interpretation is that it makes better sense of 
the peculiar nature of the observed natural phenomena that Descartes considers in the 
Principles. While the phenomena that Descartes attempts to explain in the Principles are 
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many and varied, the ones he focuses on – such as magnetism, light refraction, and 
gravity – all share the feature of not wearing their mechanical nature on their sleeves. 
Accordingly, the non-attentive mind might conclude, as William Gilbert (1958/1600) did 
regarding magnetism some fifty years before Descartes wrote the Principles, that there 
must be a non-mechanical reason why magnets behave as they do. Gilbert’s theory, if 
true, would constitute a counterexample to Descartes’ claim that his first principles suffice 
to explain all natural phenomena. In that case, Descartes would have to admit that there 
is at least one more principle – presumably, some kind of principle of magnetism – 
governing natural phenomena. 
On the current interpretation, the main purpose of discussing all these 
phenomena is, simply enough, to show Descartes’ scholastic opponents that mechanical 
explanations can be given even for these seemingly non-mechanical phenomena. It may 
require an ingenious mind like Descartes’, but it is certainly not impossible in principle, as 
Descartes shows the reader repeatedly by example. Furthermore, given the enormous 
number of phenomena that Descartes can explain in this manner we would seem to be 
warranted in generalizing from these examples, as Descartes reminds us late in part IV of 
the Principles: 
Consider how amazing are the properties of magnets and of fire, and how different 
they are from the properties we commonly observe in other bodies […] In this book I 
have deduced the causes – which I believe to be quite evident – of these and many 
other phenomena from principles which are known to all and admitted by all, namely 
the shape, size, position and motion of particles of matter. And anyone who considers 
all this will readily be convinced that there are no powers in stones and plants that are 
so mysterious, and no marvels attributed to sympathetic and antipathetic influences 
 37 
that are so astonishing that they cannot be explained in this way. In short, there is 
nothing in the whole of nature (nothing, that is, which should be referred to purely 
corporeal causes, i.e. those devoid of thought and mind) which is incapable of being 
deductively explained on the basis of these selfsame principles; and hence it is quite 
unnecessary to add any further principles to the list (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 278-9). 
The argument is clearly that since so many phenomena can be explained by appealing 
only to Descartes’ three first principles, we should “be readily convinced that” all 
phenomena can be explained in a similar manner, i.e. mechanically. If so, then not only is 
it wrong that there are counterexamples to Descartes’ claim that these are all the 
principles we need. But, further, Descartes’ claim is actually supported by the fact that 
such a great variety of phenomena can be explained mechanically. The failure of 
Descartes’ opponents to find even a single thing he can’t explain with his first principles 
constitutes a strong case for thinking that these are all the principles one needs to explain 
all natural phenomena whatsoever. 
Third, and finally, the current interpretation fits quite nicely with Descartes’ 
dialectical position when writing the Principles. As is well known, Descartes was writing in 
a time of widespread scholasticism, where explanations of natural phenomena were 
typically given in terms of things’ occult powers. Descartes rejected these scholastic 
explanations, of course. But the difference between Descartes and the Schoolmen goes 
deeper than rejecting or accepting the particular explanations given in the Schools. 
Descartes rejected the general approach of giving scholastic explanations for natural 
phenomena in terms of occult powers. So, Descartes’ dialectical position was not simply 
one of opposing the explanations given in the Schools, but one of opposing the very idea 
that one should ever appeal to explanations of a particular sort. 
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Now consider what it is to be in a dialectical position where you and your 
opponents disagree on the very nature of an adequate explanation. One way to go about 
convincing people in your audience is to show them some of the many explanations that 
can be given for various natural phenomena on your conception of explanations. Notice 
that although it is certainly a good thing if the explanations one gives in such a dialectical 
situation seem certain and self-evident, that’s not necessary as far as this project goes. All 
that is required is to convince one’s audience that some explanation or other of the right 
kind can be given for the phenomena in question. If one succeeds in doing that, one has 
made progress in convincing the audience that one’s conception of explanation is the 
correct one, even if one does not also succeed in convincing the audience that the 
particular explanations one gives are those explanations of this kind that one should end 
up endorsing. 
 The interpretation of Descartes I have been arguing for accounts for this quite 
nicely. Descartes’ way of arguing for his new approach to natural philosophy in the 
Principles is to show his audience what kind of explanations are available for various kinds 
of natural phenomena. The theories that figure in these explanations need not be certain, 
because being certain is not essential to figuring in a good scientific explanation. 
Nevertheless, such explanations can serve their dialectical role quite well, because their 
existence illustrates that there are good explanations of the form that Descartes is arguing 
for. Consequently, they show that Descartes’ general approach to scientific explanations 
can do the work required of it, viz. be used to explain all the various phenomena one 




I have given an interpretation of Descartes’ writings about scientific theories and 
explanations that enables us to take Descartes’ views on scientific explanations in the 
Principles as adequately expressed and consistent with his earlier writings. On this 
interpretation, the theories appealed to in Cartesian explanations need not be regarded as 
true, and thus such theories do not fall within the scope of Descartes’ requirement of 
certainty. Much more could be said, however, about Descartes’ requirement of certainty 
as it relates to his scientific theorizing more generally. Most importantly, it is clear from 
the text that Descartes seems to have thought that at least some of his scientific theories are 
morally, if not also absolutely, certain. It is a further question – one that I have not really 
tried to answer here – to what extent, in what sense, and why, Descartes did believe that 
these theories were certain. My claim here has been the slightly more modest one that this 
certainty is not required for the overall success of Descartes’ scientific and philosophical 
project in the Principles of Philosophy. 
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